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Abstract	
	
This	 article	 analyses	 the	 entry	 process	 of	 Mediterranean	 export	 firms	 in	 the	
American	markets	 for	packaged	olive	oil	between	 the	1880s	and	 the	1930s.	 It	
explores	whether	 those	entry	barriers	 traditionally	 identified	by	 the	 literature	
emerged	and	to	what	extent	they	influenced	such	an	entry	process.	Using	trade	
data	 for	 the	 early	1930s,	 the	 article	 shows	higher	 average	 levels	 of	 exporters’	
concentration	in	the	Americas	than	elsewhere.	It	also	documents	that	by	around	
1930	 most	 of	 the	 Mediterranean	 firms	 leading	 packaged	 olive	 oil	 exports	 to	
Argentina	and	the	USA	had	entered	the	markets	on	the	other	side	of	the	Atlantic	
before	World	War	 I.	 Finally,	 it	 identifies	product	diﬀerentiation	as	a	 source	of	
entry	 barrier	 in	markets	 for	 packaged	olive	 oil	 in	 the	 early	 1930s.	 The	 article	
suggests	 that	as	 the	American	markets	 for	 this	product	matured	early‐entrant	
advantages	 associated	 with	 the	 use	 of	 modern	 marketing	 became	 more	
apparent,	which	probably	raised	the	cost	of	entry	to	new	Mediterranean	export	
firms	during	the	inter‐war	period.	
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Introduction	
	
The	 entry	 of	 new	 competitors	 into	 a	 market	 is	 a	 basic	 issue	 in	 the	 industrial	
organisation	 literature.	There	 is	no	doubt	 that	both	market	growth	and	expected	
post‐entry	profitability	have	a	positive	eﬀect	on	entry.	Nevertheless,	 the	entry	 in	
markets	 also	 depends	 on	 the	 height	 of	 barriers	 to	 entry,	 namely,	 the	 obstacles	
found	by	the	firms	that	want	to	enter	a	given	market.	The	literature	has	generally	
identified	three	basic	sources	of	barriers.	The	 first	 is	absolute	cost	advantages	of	
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incumbents	over	entrants.	The	second	deals	with	economies	of	scale	on	the	supply	
side	 because	 to	 successfully	 enter	 a	 market	 a	 minimum	 eﬃcient	 scale	 of	 plant	
relative	to	the	market	may	be	required.	The	third	source	of	barrier	has	to	do	with	
product	diﬀerentiation	and	the	existence	of	certain	market	power	at	firm	level.	In	
general,	 this	 is	 associated	with	packaging,	 branding	and	advertising	 strategies	of	
the	established	firms,	consumers’	 loyalty	to	established	brands	and	firms	and	the	
existence	of	sunk	costs	of	both	consumers	and	entrant	firms.	
The	 potential	 relationship	 between	 the	 rise	 of	 modern	 marketing	 and	 the	
emergence	of	entry	barriers	has	also	been	of	 interest	to	business	historians.	This	
article	aims	to	contribute	to	improving	our	understanding	of	this	link	by	analysing	
the	 entry	 process	 of	 Mediterranean	 export	 firms	 in	 the	 American	 markets	 for	
packaged	olive	oil	prior	 to	World	War	 II.	 In	particular,	 it	explores	whether	 those	
entry	barriers	traditionally	identified	by	the	literature	emerged	and,	if	so,	to	what	
extent	 they	 influenced	such	an	entry	process.	One	of	 the	main	conclusions	of	 the	
article	 is	 that	 entry	 barriers	 (measured	 by	 levels	 of	 exporters’	 concentration)	
substantially	 diﬀered	 across	markets.	 On	 average,	 entry	 barriers	were	 higher	 in	
the	Americas	 than	 in	 the	Old	Continent.	Product	diﬀerentiation	seems	 to	explain	
part	 of	 this	 diﬀerence.	 As	 the	American	markets	 for	 packaged	 olive	 oil	matured,	
early	 entrants’	 advantages	 arose	 partly	 associated	 with	 product	 diﬀerentiation.	
This	 probably	 made	 the	 entry	 of	 new	 Mediterranean	 export	 firms	 into	 these	
markets	more	diﬃcult	after	World	War	I.	
The	article	is	organised	as	follows.	The	first	and	second	sections	give	an	overview	
of	 the	 dynamics	 of	 export	 firms’	 entry	 in	 the	 Americas	 between	 the	 1880s	 and	
1938.	This	 is	 followed	by	a	 short	 survey	of	 the	main	 literature	on	entry	barriers	
and	 first‐mover	 advantages.	 Using	 available	 data	 for	 Spanish	 export	 firms	 in	 the	
early	 1930s,	 the	 fourth	 section	 documents	 exporters’	 concentration	 across	
individual	 markets	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 entry	 barriers.	 The	 next	 section	 explores	 the	
determinants	of	these	entry	barriers	in	the	main	foreign	markets	for	brand‐name	
olive	oil.	The	paper	ends	with	the	conclusions.	
	
The	entry	of	Mediterranean	exporters	in	the	American	markets	for	packaged	
olive	oil	prior	to	World	War	I	
	
Until	 the	 last	 decades	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 the	 consumption	 of	 olive	 oil	
remained	at	very	low	levels	in	the	Americas.	This	situation	was,	however,	modified	
after	 the	1870s,	as	a	massive	southern	European	emigration	crossed	the	Atlantic	
Ocean	(Ramon‐Muñoz,	2009).	Clearly,	the	three	decades	prior	to	1913	represented	
a	period	of	rapid	growth	for	olive	oil	trade	in	the	Americas.	They	also	stood	for	a	
period	 of	 formation	 for	 most	 of	 the	 olive	 oil	 markets	 on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	
Atlantic.	During	these	years,	consumers’	preferences	were	created	and	commercial	
networks	were	progressively	set	up.	
Favoured	 by	 market	 growth	 as	 well	 as	 the	 opportunity	 to	 enhance	 sales,	 the	
number	of	exporting	firms	that	crossed	the	Ocean	and	entered	the	markets	of	the	
New	 World	 rapidly	 increased	 between	 1880	 and	 1913.	 Unfortunately,	 this	
phenomenon	 is	 impossible	 to	 quantify	 on	 account	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 appropriated	
information.	 Therefore,	 the	 question	 of	 firms’	 entry	 to	 the	Americas	 can	 only	 be	
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treated	at	a	very	superficial	level,	using	qualitative	information	as	well	as	sources	
that	are	too	incomplete	to	oﬀer	a	comprehensive	picture	of	the	process.	
[Table	1	about	here]	
Table	1	lists	what	appears	to	have	been	the	most	reputed	or	better‐known	brands	
(and	 firms)	 that	were	 operating	 in	 Argentina	 (one	 of	 the	 largest	markets	 of	 the	
continent)	in	the	years	circa	1887,	1900	and	1913.	The	list	has	been	made	on	the	
basis	 of	 information	 provided	 by	 both	 the	 Spanish	 and	 the	 Italian	 consuls.	
Although	imperfect,	the	data	presented	in	Table	1	is	clear	in	showing	the	existence	
of	a	remarkable	increase	in	the	process	of	entry	throughout	the	30	years	prior	to	
World	 War	 I.	 According	 to	 this	 information,	 the	 number	 of	 firms	 operating	 in	
Buenos	Aires	would	 have	more	 than	 doubled	 between	 c.	 1887	 and	 c.	 1913.	 The	
number	 of	 brands	 also	 rapidly	 increased.	 In	 this	 respect,	 it	 is	worth	 noting	 that	
prior	to	1913	a	process	of	brand	proliferation	had	taken	place	in	Argentina	and	“an	
infinity	 of	 secondary	 brands	 ha[d]	 the	 name	 of	 wholesalers	 and	 retailers”	
(Ministero	 di	 Agricoltura,	 Industria	 e	 Commercio	 [MAIC],	 1913,	 p.	 187,	 the	
translation	is	mine).	This	was	neither	specific	nor	new	to	the	Argentinean	olive	oil	
trade.	In	other	countries	of	the	New	World,	domestic	traders	also	established	their	
own	 brands,	 while	 this	 was	 quite	 an	 extended	 practice	 in	 other	 food	 and	 drink	
goods,	 such	as	wine,	during	 the	nineteenth	 century	 (Duguid,	2003;	pp.	424–432;	
Simpson,	2004,	p.	91).	
Certainly,	 the	 information	 presented	 in	 Table	 1	 does	 not	 say	 anything	 about	 the	
consequences	 of	 the	 entry	 process	 in	 terms	 of	 either	 firms’	 share	 or	 regarding	
firms’	ranking.	Although	impossible	to	know	in	detail,	it	is	obvious	that	the	entry	of	
new	competitors	in	Argentina	modified	the	market	position	of	the	incumbent	firms	
between	the	1880s	and	the	outbreak	of	World	War	I.	In	this	connection,	the	case	of	
an	Italian	firm,	Giuseppe	Ottone	&	Figli,	needs	to	be	pointed	out.	Set	up	in	Genoa	in	
the	nineteenth	century,	Ottone	soon	took	the	lead	in	Argentina.	Between	the	mid‐
1880s	and	the	early	1890s,	it	accounted	for	around	half	of	the	Argentinean	olive	oil	
market	 share.	By	 then,	 Italian	olive	oil	 represented	70–80%	of	 total	Argentinean	
imports,	which	means	that	throughout	these	years	Ottone	was	the	Italian	leader	in	
Argentina.	Because	of	 this,	 it	 has	been	 considered	 that	 this	 company	 formed	 the	
basic	taste	for	olive	oil	in	Argentina	(Fernández,	2004,	p.	95;	Ministerio	de	Estado,	
1899,	pp.	47–48).	
However,	 Ottone’s	 reign	 did	 not	 last	 forever.	 In	 the	 course	 of	 the	 two	 following	
decades,	 Ottone	 still	 stood	 out	 from	 most	 of	 the	 Mediterranean	 export	 firms	
trading	with	Argentina,	but	was	losing	ground	relative	to	other	Italian	and	Spanish	
competitors.	Thus,	 it	 cannot	be	discounted	 that	by	1913	Tommaso	Moro	&	Figli,	
another	Genoese	 firm,	had	already	 replaced	Ottone	as	 the	 largest	Mediterranean	
exporter	of	olive	oil	to	Argentina.	
Of	 course,	Ottone	was	 not	 alone	 in	 losing	 share	 as	 new	 competitors	 entered	 the	
Argentinean	market.	 During	 the	 three	 decades	 preceding	 the	 outbreak	 of	World	
War	I,	two	well‐known	French	firms	seem	to	have	experienced	a	similar	situation.	
One	of	them	was	a	firm	called	James	Plagniol	(brand	Plagniol)	which	was	set	up	at	
the	 beginning	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 in	 Marseilles.	 The	 other	 was	 also	 a	
Marseilles	 firm	 named	 Adolphe	 Puget	 (brand	 Puget)	 which	 was	 established	 in	
1857.	With	presence	in	the	Americas	long	before	the	1880s,	these	two	firms	were	
able	to	achieve	a	great	reputation	for	their	olive	oils	because	they	manufactured	a	
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high	quality	product	(ME,	1899,	p.	48;	Galula,	1985,	p.	126).	
The	available	evidence	suggests	that	between	the	late	1880s	and	the	early	1910s	
the	 share	 of	 these	 two	 firms	might	 have	 been	 reduced	while	 their	 reputation	 as	
providers	of	a	high‐quality	olive	oil	remained	untouched.	Unfortunately,	the	lack	of	
detailed	 data	makes	 it	 impossible	 to	 know	 the	 extent	 of	 this	 likely	 reduction.	 If	
Plagniol	and	Puget	are	assumed	to	have	accounted	for	the	bulk	of	French	olive	oil	
exports	to	Argentina,	then	the	share	losses	might	have	been	significant.	In	any	case,	
there	is	no	doubt	that	French	olive	oil	exports	(and	probably	the	market	position	of	
French	firms)	substantially	declined	relative	to	the	Argentinean	market.	Between	
1885–89	 and	 1909–13,	 their	 share	 fell	 11	 percentage	 points,	 from	 15%	 to	 4%	
(Fernández,	2004,	Appendix	2).	
As	other	early	entrants,	 the	Spanish	export	pioneers	also	 lost	share	from	the	 late	
nineteenth	 century.	 One	 of	 these	 Spanish	 pioneers	 was	 Manuel	 Porcar	 y	 Tió.	
Originating	 in	 the	 Catalan	 city	 of	 Tortosa,	 in	 the	 1870s,	 this	 entrepreneur	 was	
already	operating	 in	the	Antilles	and	Rio	de	Janeiro	(Brazil);	and	in	the	1880s	he	
was	leading	a	small	group	of	Spanish	exporters	to	Argentina,	which	included	firms	
such	as	Quinzà,	Conill	Hermanos	and	Sensat.	Nevertheless,	 from	the	first	years	of	
the	twentieth	century,	Porcar	y	Tió,	as	well	as	other	pioneering	firms,	faced	strong	
competition	 from	 other	 Spanish	 exporters,	 especially	 from	 the	 Catalan	 José	 Bau.	
Also	established	in	the	city	of	Tortosa	in	1842,	Bau	had	begun	to	export	olive	oil	to	
Argentina	around	1900,	and	by	1913	he	had	already	become	the	 largest	Spanish	
olive	 oil	 exporter	 to	 this	 South	 American	 country	 as	 well	 as	 one	 of	 the	 most	
important	Mediterranean	firms	in	terms	of	olive	oil	exports	to	Argentina	(Boletín	
del	Centro	de	Información	Comercial	[BCIC],	25	March	1914,	no.	289,	p.	2).1	
The	entry	of	new	firms	into	the	market	accelerated	not	only	in	Argentina	after	the	
1880s,	but	also	in	many	other	markets	in	the	Americas.	If	market	growth	serves	as	
an	indicator	of	the	dynamism	of	entry,	it	is	clear	that	export	firms’	entry	was	very	
intense	in	the	USA	after	1880;	in	Brazil	and	Chile	after	1890;	and	in	Uruguay	and	
Mexico	after	1900.	In	these	countries,	olive	oil	consumption	achieved	annual	rates	
of	growth	of	over	5%	in	the	two	or	three	decades	before	World	War	I.	
	
The	entry	of	Mediterranean	exporters	in	the	American	markets	for	packaged	
olive	oil	after	the	outbreak	of	World	War	I	
	
Did	new	exporters	of	packaged	olive	oil	enter	into	the	Americas	during	the	inter‐
war	 years?	 The	 answer	 is	 positive,	 as	 shown	 in	 commercial	 reports	 and	 trade	
journals.	The	question	becomes	whether	during	the	 inter‐war	period	the	process	
of	 entry	 of	Mediterranean	 exporters	 into	 the	 American	markets	 for	 brand‐name	
olive	oil	was	as	intense	as	in	previous	decades.	
Judging	from	the	available	evidence	on	trade	and	other	anecdotal	information,	the	
                                                            
1	As	can	be	deduced	from	the	previous	description,	most	of	the	Spanish	early	movers	were	Catalan	
firms.	In	this	respect,	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	majority	of	Mediterranean	exporters	that	entered	
the	 Americas	 earlier	 came	 from	 regions	 characterised	 by	manufacturing	 a	 high‐quality	 product,	
including	Provence	in	France,	Liguria	and	Tuscany	in	Italy	and	Catalonia	in	Spain	(for	the	particular	
case	 of	 Spain,	 see,	 for	 example,	 Hernández	 Armenteros,	 2001;	 Nadal,	 1989;	 Parejo	 &	 Zambrana,	
1994;	Pinilla,	1995;	Ramon‐Muñoz,	2000b;	Simpson,	1995;	Zambrana,	1987).	
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process	of	(gross)	entry	seems	to	have	enormously	accelerated	during	the	years	of	
World	 War	 I.	 The	 facts	 can	 be	 summarised	 as	 follows.	 Italy	 and	 France,	 which	
supplied	a	large	share	of	the	packaged	olive	oil	consumed	into	the	Americas,	were	
involved	in	the	Great	War.	Therefore,	Spain	was	transformed	de	facto	into	the	only	
producing	 country	 with	 capacity	 to	 supply	 olive	 oil	 to	 the	 American	 continent	
(Ramon‐Muñoz,	2000b;	Zambrana,	1987).	This	caused	many	Spanish	firms	to	enter	
markets	 on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 Atlantic,	 whereas	 the	 contrary	 holds	 true	 for	
French	and	Italian	firms.	
The	entry	of	new	Spanish	exporters	is	only	a	part	of	the	story,	however.	The	other	
has	 to	do	with	 the	 tendency	of	 importers	and	domestic	 traders	 to	establish	 their	
own	 lines	 of	 products	 and	 brands	 in	 the	 New	 World.	 As	 mentioned,	 this	
phenomenon	 was	 already	 in	 force	 prior	 to	 1913,	 but	 during	 the	 war	 years	 it	
continued	(and	perhaps	reinforced).	To	give	an	example,	prompted	by	lower	tariﬀ	
rates,	bulk	olive	oil	 imports	 to	be	blended,	packaged	and	branded	boomed	in	the	
USA	from	1897	to	1913,	and	doubled	during	the	conflagration	years.	As	a	result,	in	
the	period	1914–19,	 they	accounted	 for	more	 than	half	of	 the	 total	USA	olive	oil	
imports.2	
The	end	of	 the	war,	 and	 the	 following	 two	decades,	marked	a	new	period	 in	 the	
process	of	entry	and	exit,	which	was	characterised	by	 two	main	breaking	points.	
The	first	had	to	do	with	a	certain	return	to	normality.	The	Italian	and	(to	a	lesser	
extent)	the	French	firms	resumed	their	exports,	whereas	some	of	the	Spanish	firms	
that	 had	 entered	 the	market	 during	 the	war	 years	 progressively	 abandoned	 the	
Americas	during	the	course	of	the	1920s.	The	second	breaking	point	was	related	to	
the	 1929	 international	 crisis.	 The	 collapse	 of	 the	 American	markets	 for	 olive	 oil	
discouraged	 the	entry	of	new	export	 firms,	and	also	seems	 to	have	accelerated	a	
process	of	exit.	The	Spanish	Civil	War	was	also	a	catalyst	in	this	process	and	caused	
many	 Spanish	 to	 abandon	 these	 markets.	 These	 factors	 led	 to	 an	 increase	 in	
consumption	 of	 Turkish	 and	 Greek	 olive	 oil	 on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 Atlantic.	
However,	 the	 olive	 oil	 being	 exported	 from	 these	 two	 Eastern	 Mediterranean	
countries	 was	 mostly	 traded	 in	 bulk	 to	 be	 used	 for	 blending	 and	 packaging	
purposes	by	domestic	 firms	rather	 than	 traded	 in	cans	and	bottles	 to	be	directly	
consumed	by	the	end	consumers.	
[Table	2	about	here]	
In	conclusion,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	when	 the	 inter‐war	period	 is	 taken	as	a	whole,	 the	
entry	of	Mediterranean	export	firms	into	the	Americas	had	been	less	intense	than	
in	 previous	 decades.	 This	 was	 probably	more	 apparent	 among	 the	 group	 of	 the	
most	reputed	and	better‐known	export	firms.	Table	2	identifies	the	largest	Italian	
and	 Spanish	 exporters	 of	 packaged	 olive	 oil	 to	 Argentina	 and	 the	 USA	 around	
1930.3	With	the	exception	of	six	firms	(and	perhaps	fewer),	the	rest	of	the	23	olive	
                                                            
2	For	more	details	on	 the	USA	market,	 see,	 for	example,	Ramon‐Muñoz	(2000a,	2000b)	or	Taylor	
(2000).	
3	The	trade	data	used	in	the	construction	of	Table	2	have	two	diﬀerent	origins.	For	Argentina,	the	
information	 has	 been	 elaborated	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 commercial	 reports	 for	 the	 period	 between	 13	
September	 1932	 and	 31	December	 1933	 (Ramon‐Muñoz,	 2000c,	 p.	 200).	 For	 the	USA,	 figures	 at	
firm	level	come	from	Espuny	(2002,	pp.	48–51),	a	Spanish	olive	oil	exporter	who	travelled	to	the	
USA	in	1929	in	order	to	know	the	characteristics	of	this	market.	Using	this	source	as	well	as	the	USA	
foreign	trade	statistics	(The	Foreign	Commerce	and	Navigation	of	the	United	States,	several	years),	
Table	2	shows	what	might	be	the	lower	and	upper	bounds	of	the	actual	values,	but	further	research	
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oil	exporters	listed	in	the	table	had	begun	to	export	to	the	other	side	of	the	Atlantic	
prior	 to	 1914.	 Furthermore,	 a	 significant	 number	 of	 these	 23	 firms	 had	 already	
achieved	leading	positions	(or,	at	least,	were	well‐known	firms)	in	the	Americas	by	
the	eve	of	World	War	I	or	before.4	
Francesco	Bertolli	was	one	of	them.	By	the	late	1920s	and	early	1930s,	it	was	one	
of	 the	most	 successful	 firms	 in	 the	USA.	 It	was	 also	 a	 leading	 firm	 in	 Brazil	 and	
probably	in	other	Latin	American	markets.	However,	the	importance	of	Bertolli	as	
an	olive	oil	exporter	was	not	a	novelty	of	the	inter‐war	period.	In	1913,	the	Italian	
Chamber	of	Commerce	of	San	Francisco	reported	that	olive	oil	from	several	brands	
was	 consumed	 in	 California,	 but	 only	 “the	 brands	 Francesconi	 and	Bertolli	were	
credited	all	over	the	USA”	(MAIC,	1913,	p.	139,	the	translation	is	mine).	In	the	same	
years,	 the	 Italian	 consuls	 in	 Brazil	 and	 Colombia	 mentioned	 the	 name	 of	 this	
Tuscan	firm	in	their	reports,	while	 it	 is	also	known	that	before	1913	Bertolli	was	
involved	 in	 commercial	 business	 between	 Argentina	 and	 Italy	 (MAIC,	 1913,	 pp.	
238–274;	Segreto,	1988;	Stumpo,	2003).	
Of	the	Spaniards,	Hijos	de	Ybarra	was	the	firm	that	in	the	early	1930s	exported	the	
most	 canned	olive	oil	 to	 the	Americas.	 Set	up	 in	1842,	 this	was	a	 solid	 company	
involved	 in	 several	 businesses,	 including	 wine	 production,	 finances,	 mining,	
shipping,	and,	of	course,	olive	oil	production	and	trade	(Díaz	Morlán,	2002;	Sierra,	
1992,	pp.	38–61).	The	point	that	needs	to	be	stressed	is	that	Ybarra	had	probably	
entered	the	Southern	American	markets	for	olive	oil	during	the	first	decade	of	the	
twentieth	 century.	 The	 available	 information	 suggests	 that	 by	 the	 eve	 of	World	
War	I	Ybarra’s	position	was	weak	in	Argentina	as	well	as	 in	the	USA.	However,	 it	
was	stronger	in	other	places	on	the	New	Continent,	such	as	Mexico	and	perhaps	in	
some	other	small	Latin	American	markets	(MAIC,	1913,	p.	111).	
Of	 course,	 Bertolli	 and	 Ybarra	 were	 not	 alone	 on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 Atlantic.	
Table	 2	 makes	 clear	 that	 in	 the	 late	 1920s	 and	 early	 1930s	 other	 Tuscan	 and	
Ligurian	firms	such	as	Fratelli	Berio,	Giacomo	Costa,	Carlo	Daneri,	Escoﬃer	Guidi,	
Joseph	Lupi,	Tommaso	Moro,	Giorgio	Ottone,	Pietro	Salvo,	SALOV	or	P.	Sasso	had	
achieved	 leading	 positions	 in	 the	 Americas.	 It	 also	 shows	 that	 Bau,	 Carbonell,	
Longoria,	 Luca	 de	 Tena	 and	 Sensat	 had	 taken	 the	 lead	 among	 the	 Spanish	
exporters.	Again,	 it	must	be	stressed	that	all	these	firms	had	entered	the	markets	
on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 Atlantic	 relatively	 early,	 and	 by	 the	 first	 decade	 of	 the	
twentieth	 century	 many	 of	 them	 were	 also	 well	 known	 there	 (Castejón,	 1977;	
Cerisola,	 1973;	 Isolica	 1996/97;	 MAIC,	 1913;	 Muguerza,	 1909;	 Ramon‐Muñoz,	
2010).	
The	 dynamics	 of	 the	Mediterranean	 olive	 oil	 export	 firms	 in	 the	 Americas	 is	 far	
from	 completely	 understood.	 Nevertheless,	 at	 the	 present	 stage	 of	 research	 the	
available	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 relative	 to	 previous	 decades,	 the	 entry	 of	 new	
brand‐name	olive	oil	exporters	in	the	Americas	decelerated	during	the	1920s	and	
1930s,	and	that	when	entry	 took	place	 it	was	probably	 focused	on	the	periphery	
rather	than	on	the	core	of	the	export	industry.	
                                                                                                                                                                              
is	required	in	order	to	produce	more	accurate	data.	For	a	more	detailed	description	of	sources,	see	
also	Ramon‐Muñoz	(2010).	
4 The	firms	that	did	not	export	packaged	olive	oil	to	the	Americas	prior	to	1914	were	Olivarera	del	
Mediterráneo,	 ASTOR,	Hijos	 de	 José	 Sabater	 and,	 perhaps,	 Vincenzo	 Salvo,	 Frugone	&	 Preve	 and	
Daneri.	
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The	determinants	of	entry	into	markets:	a	short	overview	
	
Having	said	this,	the	question	that	immediately	arises	is	how	the	entry	process	to	
the	Americas	might	be	understood.	The	existing	literature	on	the	determinants	of	
entry	into	markets	suggests	diﬀerent	answers	to	this	question.	At	first	glance,	the	
subject	of	new	entry	 into	markets	might	seem	quite	a	simple	 issue.	Firms	decide	
whether	 to	 enter	 markets	 depending	 on	 their	 expected	 post‐entry	 profitability.	
However,	the	fact	is	that	profitability	(and	therefore	entry)	is	determined	by	many	
factors.	 These	 include	market	 structure	 (i.e.	 the	 height	 of	 barriers	 to	 entry),	 the	
existence	of	potential	 early‐entrant	 advantages,	 the	 response	of	 incumbent	 firms	
when	they	face	the	threat	of	potential	new	entrants,	and	market	evolution	(i.e.	the	
dynamism	or	maturity	of	markets).	
Among	all	these	factors,	entry	barriers	and	early‐entrant	advantages	have	become	
basic	issues	in	the	literature	dealing	with	entry,	exit	and	survival.	The	connection	
between	 entry	 process,	 entry	 barriers	 and	 advantages	 of	 incumbent	 firms	 has	
existed	 in	 the	 economic	 literature	 for	 a	 long	 time.	 As	 early	 as	 1956,	 Joe	 S.	 Bain	
argued	 that	 the	 condition	 of	 entry	 in	 a	 given	 industry	 was	 associated	 with	 the	
existence	 of	 entry	 barriers.	 He	 defined	 this	 as	 “the	 advantages	 of	 established	
sellers	in	an	industry	over	potential	entrants”	(Bain,	1956,	p.	3).	These	advantages	
allowed	incumbent	firms	to	earn	supernormal	profits	without	threat	of	entry.	Bain	
also	 argued	 that	 there	 were	 three	major	 types	 of	 entry	 barriers	 or	 three	major	
advantages	 to	 incumbent	 firms:	 economies	 of	 scale	 advantages,	 absolute	 cost	
advantages	and,	finally,	product	diﬀerentiation	advantages.	
Since	 the	 publication	 of	 Bain’s	 seminal	 study,	 the	 bibliography	 devoted	 to	
analysing	 the	 real	 influence	of	 these	 three	barriers	on	entry	has	become	vast.	 In	
spite	 of	 this,	 both	 theoretical	 analysis	 and	 empirical	 works	 have	 not	 provided	
conclusive	 answers.	 An	 example	 of	 this	 is	 found	 in	 the	 case	 of	 product	
diﬀerentiation.	 In	 theory,	 product	 diﬀerentiation	 gives	 the	 early	 entrants	 the	
advantage	 of	 forming	 consumers’	 preferences,	 whereas	 late	 entrants	 face	
supplementary	 costs,	 as	 they	 have	 to	 change	 these	 preferences.	 Consumers‘	
preferences	 for	 established	 firms’	 products	 are	 in	 part	 the	 result	 of	 advertising	
campaigns	and	other	marketing	strategies.	This	helps	to	create	brand	loyalty	and	
niche	markets,	which	contribute	to	the	emergence	of	monopoly	power	at	firm	level	
(Schmalensee,	1974).	Consumers’	preferences	for	established	firms’	products	also	
arise	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 switching	 costs.	 These	 are	 the	 costs	 incurred	 when	 a	
customer	 changes	 from	 one	 supplier	 to	 another	 (Schmalensee,	 1982).	 In	 this	
context,	 pioneering	 firms	 and	 brands	may	 have	 some	 advantages	 over	 potential	
new	 entrants,	 since	 the	 latter	may	 have	 to	 incur	 additional	 costs	 in	 the	 form	 of	
price	 cuts,	 advertising	 campaigns	 and	 other	 marketing	 strategies	 in	 order	 to	
persuade	 consumers	 to	 buy	 a	 new	 brand.	 These	 can	 be	 considered	 sunk	 costs	
(Sutton,	1991).	If	the	product	launched	by	the	potential	entrant	is	not	successful	in	
the	 market,	 the	 associated	 costs	 will	 be	 impossible	 to	 recover.	 The	 final	
consequence	 would	 be	 that	 product	 diﬀerentiation	 would	 benefit	 early	 movers,	
whereas	for	potential	entrants	it	would	raise	entry	barriers	and	discourage	entry.	
Although	 many	 studies	 have	 defended	 the	 role	 of	 product	 diﬀerentiation	 as	 an	
entry	 barrier,	 the	 fact	 is	 that	 there	 are	 also	 others	 that	 have	 questioned	 the	
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advantages	of	established	firms	based	on	product	diﬀerentiation.5	For	example,	it	
has	been	argued	that	the	overall	eﬀect	of	advertising	on	entry	is	positive	(Kessides,	
1986)	 or	 also	 that	 switching	 costs	 are	 more	 obvious	 in	 some	 products	 than	 in	
others	 (Mueller,	 1991).	 A	 conclusive	 answer	 regarding	 the	 consequences	 of	
product	 diﬀerentiation	 on	 entry	 is	 not	 easy	 to	 give.	 Nevertheless,	 in	 the	 early	
1990s	Geroski	 concluded	 that	 “although	diﬃcult	 to	 think	of	as	a	 structural	entry	
barrier,	 [the]	 influence	 [of	 product	 diﬀerentiation	 advantages]...	 is	 hard	 to	 deny”	
(Geroski,	1991,	p.	204;	see	also	Geroski,	1995,	p.	429).	
In	 addition	 to	 entry	 barriers,	 entry	 may	 also	 be	 aﬀected	 by	 the	 evolution	 of	
markets.	Thus,	it	has	been	suggested	that	entry	rates	vary	over	time	depending	on	
the	maturity	of	markets	(e.g.	Agarwal	&	Gort,	1996;	Geroski,	1995;	Gort	&	Klepper,	
1982;	Mueller,	 1991).	Rates	 of	 entry	 are	 expected	 to	 be	 relatively	high	 in	 young	
industries	 or	 markets	 and	 the	 other	 way	 around.	 Interestingly,	 in	 arguing	 why	
entry	declines	in	mature	markets,	three	main	reasons	associated	with	the	potential	
advantages	 of	 early	 entrants	 are	 suggested.	 First,	 consumer	 preferences	 have	
become	 reasonably	well	 formed;	 second,	distribution	 systems	have	already	been	
set	up;	 third,	 the	 leaders	tend	to	be	protected	by	their	product	 images	as	well	as	
some	other	advantages	closely	connected	with	the	fact	of	being	an	early	entrant	in	
the	 market.	 Consequently,	 in	 mature	 markets	 new	 entrants	 face	 disadvantages	
relative	 to	 the	 incumbent	 firms,	whereas	entry	 tends	 to	be	 largely	 limited	 to	 the	
industry’s	periphery.	
Although	many	empirical	analyses	have	found	that	pioneering	firms	tend	to	have	
higher	market	shares	than	later	entrants,	the	advantages	of	the	early	movers	can	
be	 exaggerated.	 In	 fact,	 first‐movers	 also	 have	 disadvantages,	 while	 there	 are	
advantages	 for	 later	 entrants.	 These	 latter	 may	 learn	 from	 the	 mistakes	 of	 the	
former	and	may	avoid	technological	and	demand	uncertainties.6	In	part	because	of	
this,	some	authors	have	questioned	the	general	idea	that	pioneers	have	long‐lived	
market	share	advantages	(e.g.	Golder	&	Tellis,	1993).	
The	literature	on	business	history	has	also	dealt	with	these	issues,	particularly	in	
works	 on	 food	 and	 beverages.	 In	 general,	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 pioneer	
advantages	 existed	 and	 acted	 as	 barriers	 to	 entry,	 although	 to	 become	 eﬀective	
such	 advantages	 have	 to	 be	 supported	by	 a	number	 of	 factors,	 including,	 among	
others,	the	capacity	of	managing	external	and	internal	change,	product	upgrading	
and	marketing	 investment	 (e.g.	Lopes,	2007;	Lopes	&	Casson,	2007;	 Jones,	1994;	
Tedlow,	1990,	1993).	Branding	and	advertising	are,	certainly,	important	strategies	
to	retain	(or	to	increase)	market	shares	(e.g.	Collins,	1994;	Weir,	1994).7	In	some	
cases,	however,	 incumbent	 firms’	 investments	 in	product	diﬀerentiation	may	not	
prevent	 entry	 (Mata,	 2009),	 while	 some	 authors	 have	 relaxed	 the	 connection	
between	 product	 diﬀerentiation,	 first‐mover	 advantages	 and	 entry	 barriers	
(Balasubramanyam	&	Salisu,	1994).	
	
                                                            
5For	 a	 survey	 of	 the	 empirical	 literature,	 see,	 for	 example,	 Comanor	 and	 Wilson	 (1979),	
Schmalensee	(1989)	and	Geroski	(1991).	
6	 For	 a	 review	 of	 this	 literature,	 see,	 for	 example,	 Lieberman	 and	 Montgomery	 (1988,	 1998),	
Robinson,	Kalyanaram	and	Urban	(1994)	and	Kalyanaram,	Robinson	and	Urban	(1996).	
7	 For	 a	more	 general	discussion	on	 the	nature	 and	 functions	of	 brands	 see,	 for	 example,	Wilkins	
(1992,	 1994)	 and	 Casson	 (1994).	 See	 also	 Church	 and	 Godley	 (2003a,	 p.	 1),	 regarding	 the	
interpretation	of	marketing	as	a	cause	of	industrial	concentration	and	barrier	to	market	entry. 
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Entry	 barriers	 and	 exporters’	 concentration	 across	 markets	 in	 the	 early	
1930s	
	
So,	which	of	the	factors	traditionally	suggested	by	the	literature	better	explains	the	
entry	 process	 of	Mediterranean	 exporters	 of	 packaged	 olive	 oil	 to	 the	 Americas	
prior	to	World	War	II?	Before	giving	any	answer,	it	is	worth	noting	that	in	the	early	
1930s	most	of	those	firms	leading	packaged	olive	oil	exports	on	the	other	side	of	
the	 Atlantic	 had	 already	 penetrated	 the	markets	 of	 the	Americas	 prior	 to	World	
War	 I.	 This	 may	 suggest	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 sort	 of	 early‐mover	 advantage	 and,	
therefore,	 entry	 barriers	 for	 potential	 later	 entrants.	 Consequently,	 it	 could	 be	
argued	 that	 the	 likely	 post‐World	 War	 I	 reduction	 in	 entry	 of	 Mediterranean	
exporters	to	the	American	markets	for	packaged	olive	oil	was	due	to	the	existence	
of	increasing	entry	barriers	in	most	of	the	markets	on	the	other	side	of	the	Atlantic.	
	[Figures	1	and	2	about	here]	
The	most	 important	 point	 in	 the	 confirmation	 of	 this	 hypothesis	 is	 to	 show	 that	
entry	barriers	were	generally	higher	in	the	Americas	than	elsewhere.	However,	the	
problem	is	how	to	measure	the	height	of	these	barriers.	According	to	the	classical	
literature	 on	 industrial	 organisation,	 the	 structure	 of	 markets	 tends	 to	 diﬀer	
depending	on	the	height	of	the	entry	barriers.	More	precisely,	the	higher	the	entry	
barriers	 in	 a	 given	 industry	 or	 market,	 the	 stronger	 the	 levels	 of	 firms’	
concentration	in	that	market.	There	is	no	reason	to	think	that	foreign	markets	for	
olive	 oil	 performed	 in	 a	 diﬀerent	 way.	 Therefore,	 one	 possibility	 is	 to	 look	 at	
exporters’	 concentration	 across	markets	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 a	 proxy	measure	 for	
entry	barriers.	If	entry	barriers	were	really	higher	in	the	Americas	than	elsewhere,	
one	would	 expect	 to	 find	higher	 levels	 of	 exporters’	 concentration	 in	 the	 former	
rather	than	in	the	latter	markets.	
	[Table	3	about	here]	
Unfortunately,	 analysing	 the	 structure	 of	 foreign	 markets	 for	 olive	 oil	 prior	 to	
World	War	II	is	not	an	easy	task	because	quantitative	evidence	is	extremely	scarce.	
The	 only	 systematic	 information	 I	 have	 been	 able	 to	 find	 comes	 from	 Spain.	 It	
refers	to	the	export	orientation	of	a	wide	sample	of	Spanish	olive	oil	firms	for	the	
period	1930–34,	which	on	average	represented	around	90%	of	 the	total	olive	oil	
exported	 from	 Spain.8	 This	 information	 is	 summarised	 in	 Figures	 1	 and	 2	 and	
Table	3.	
Two	alternative	concentration	indexes	are	presented.	The	first	one	is	the	four‐firm	
concentration	 ratio	 (C4).	 It	 is	 calculated	 by	 summing	 up	 the	 shares	 of	 the	 four	
largest	Spanish	exporting	firms	in	a	given	market	relative	to	the	olive	oil	exported	
to	 that	 market	 by	 all	 the	 Spanish	 firms	 in	 the	 sample.	 The	 second	 index	 is	 the	
Hirschman–Herfindahl	index	(HHI).	In	contrast	with	C4,	the	HHI	takes	into	account	
the	 shares	 of	 all	 the	 firms	 in	 the	market,	 as	 it	 is	 calculated	 by	 summing	 up	 the	
squared	market	shares	of	each	Spanish	firm	in	the	selected	export	market.9	In	spite	
                                                            
8	For	further	details	on	these	data,	see	Ramon‐Muñoz	(2000b,	2000c).	
9 Again,	firms’	market	share	is	estimated	relative	to	the	total	olive	oil	exported	to	that	market	by	all	
the	Spanish	firms	in	the	sample.	The	HHI	ranges	up	to	1	or	up	to	10,000	if	percents	are	used.	For	a	
further	 discussion	 in	 the	 use	 of	 alternative	 measures	 of	 concentration	 in	 the	 industry,	 see,	 for	
example,	Clarke	(1985,	chapter	2).	
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of	their	diﬀerences,	the	results	presented	in	both	Figures	1	and	2	and	Table	3	tell	
the	 same	 story.	 They	 show	 a	 remarkable	 variation	 on	 exporters’	 concentration	
across	foreign	markets.	This	suggests	that	market	structures,	and	therefore	entry	
barriers,	also	diﬀered	across	foreign	markets.	
The	 key	 point	 is	 to	 assess	 whether	 levels	 of	 concentration	 of	 Spanish	 olive	 oil	
exporters	were	higher	in	the	American	markets	than	elsewhere.	At	first	glance,	the	
results	 shown	 in	 Figures	 1	 and	2	 as	well	 as	Table	 3	 (columns	 II	 and	 III),	 do	not	
seem	 to	 confirm	 the	 existence	 of	 higher	 concentrations	 of	 exporters	 for	 the	
markets	of	 the	Americas	relative	 to	 the	rest	of	 the	world.	To	start	with,	a	simple	
inspection	 of	 Figures	 1	 and	 2	makes	 it	 clear	 that	 together	with	 the	 Central	 and	
Southern	American	Republics	several	Northern	European	countries	also	stood	out	
from	the	rest	of	the	countries	included	in	the	sample.	At	a	regional	or	continental	
level,	the	results	are	not	very	diﬀerent.	The	unweighted	average	of	the	22	markets	
of	 the	 New	 World	 included	 in	 the	 sample	 yielded	 a	 level	 of	 exporters’	
concentration	that	was	practically	the	same	as	the	16	markets	of	the	Old	Continent	
when	 measured	 by	 the	 C4.	 If	 measured	 by	 the	 HHI	 the	 results	 are	 still	 more	
surprising.	On	 average,	 the	 former	 had	 a	 concentration	 level	 4%	 lower	 than	 the	
latter	(Table	3,	columns	II	and	III).	
According	to	these	results,	it	would	seem	obvious	to	conclude	that	in	the	Americas,	
entry	 barriers	 for	 potential	 olive	 oil	 exporters	 were	 similar	 to	 other	 markets.	
Consequently,	 other	 factors	 would	 explain	 the	 likely	 decline	 of	 entry	 of	 brand‐
name	olive	oil	exporters	to	the	New	World	after	World	War	I.	However,	this	could	
be	a	misleading	conclusion.	The	literature	on	industrial	organisation	has	not	only	
made	it	clear	that	levels	of	concentration	are	determined	by	entry	barriers,	but	has	
also	 pointed	 out	 that	 concentration	 can	 also	 be	 associated	 with	 the	 size	 of	 the	
markets.	It	has	argued	that	ceteris	paribus	a	negative	relationship	between	market	
size	and	concentration	level	should	be	expected,	since	an	expansion	in	the	size	of	
the	market	not	only	raises	the	profitability	of	incumbents,	but	also	the	expectation	
of	 profits.	 These	 facts	 tend	 to	 induce	 potential	 competitors	 to	 enter	 the	market,	
causing	concentration	to	fall	(Schmalensee,	1989;	see	also	Sutton,	1991).	
The	size	of	the	market	certainly	seems	to	determine	the	results	plotted	in	Figures	1	
and	 2,	 as	 well	 as	 those	 shown	 in	 Table	 3	 (columns	 II	 and	 III).	 One	 of	 the	most	
salient	 characteristics	 of	 the	markets	with	 the	 highest	 levels	 of	 concentration	 is	
that	they	were	all	small	markets	by	Spanish	olive	oil	foreign	trade	standards.	Thus,	
as	 most	 of	 the	 43	 markets	 considered	 in	 our	 sample	 are	 relatively	 small,	
concentration	levels	appear	to	be	mostly	determined	by	market	size		
The	picture	changes	radically	when	the	market	size	eﬀect	is	neutralised	either	by	
using	aggregated	 information	at	 regional	 and	 continental	 level	 or	by	 considering	
only	 the	 largest	markets	 in	 the	sample.	As	shown	 in	Table	3	(columns	 IV	and	V),	
levels	of	exporters’	concentration	become	higher	in	the	Americas	as	a	whole	rather	
than	in	any	other	continent	or	region.	For	example,	by	1930/34	the	New	Continent	
had	on	average	 levels	of	 exporters’	 concentration	between	23%	and	26%	higher	
than	 the	 Old	 Continent,	 depending	 on	 the	 measure	 of	 concentration	 used.	 In	
addition,	 levels	 of	 exporters’	 concentration	were	 especially	 high	 in	 the	 Southern	
part	of	the	Americas.	They	had	an	index	between	1.7	and	2.2	higher	than	in	Europe.	
The	 results	 would	 not	 substantially	 change	 if	 instead	 of	 looking	 at	 regions	 or	
continents,	we	looked	at	the	largest	markets	on	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic	(Ramon‐
Muñoz,	2000b,	p.	117).	
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The	sources	of	entry	barriers	in	the	Americas:	hypotheses	and	evidence	
	
To	 sum	 up,	 the	 available	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 entry	 barriers	 were	 generally	
higher	 in	 the	 Americas	 than	 elsewhere.	 The	 question	 that	 immediately	 arises	 is	
why	 entry	 barriers	 became	 higher	 in	 the	 Americas.	 As	 mentioned	 above,	 the	
literature	on	industrial	organisation	has	suggested	three	basic	categories	of	entry	
barriers.	 These	 include	 product	 diﬀerentiation,	 which	 tends	 to	 lead	 to	 the	
existence	of	certain	market	power	at	firm	level,	economies	of	scale	on	the	supply	
side	and,	finally,	absolute	cost	advantages	of	incumbents	over	entrants.	
	
Product	diﬀerentiation	
	
In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Americas,	 product	 diﬀerentiation	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 obvious	
candidate.	This	is	mainly	due	to	the	marketing	strategies	that	followed	most	of	the	
exporting	 firms	 trading	 olive	 oil	 to	 the	New	World	 since	 the	 last	 decades	 of	 the	
nineteenth	century.	They	have	included	the	use	of	modern	marketing	techniques,	
which	 confirms	 what	 other	 studies	 have	 shown:	 from	 the	 nineteenth	 century	
onwards	 modern	 marketing	 spread	 over	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 consumer	 goods	
industries	and	played	an	important	role	in	enhancing	competitiveness.10	
In	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 and	 early	 twentieth	 centuries,	 international	 markets	 for	
olive	oil	could	be	divided	 into	two	main	categories	 in	 terms	of	export	marketing.	
The	first	corresponded	to	those	import	markets	where	the	product	generally	came	
in	 bulk,	 to	 be	 used	 either	 as	 a	 raw	 material	 or	 to	 be	 submitted	 to	 further	
manipulations	 before	 arriving	 with	 the	 final	 consumer.	 The	 second	 category	
corresponded	to	those	markets	where	exporters	mainly	sent	a	finished	product,	to	
be	directly	consumed	by	the	end	user.	The	markets	on	the	other	side	of	the	Atlantic	
mostly	fell	into	this	latter	category	(Ramon‐Muñoz,	2000a,	pp.	160–168).	
Thus,	packaging,	branding	and	advertising	became	essential	factors	in	penetrating	
the	American	markets	 for	olive	oil.	This	was	 so	 in	 the	 formative	phases	of	 these	
markets.	To	give	an	example,	in	explaining	the	success	of	the	Spanish	exporter	José	
Bau	in	Argentina	prior	to	World	War	I,	many	contemporaries	considered	a	crucial	
factor	 that	he	regularly	 (and	 intensively)	advertised	his	products	 in	 journals	and	
newspapers	(BCIC,	10	November	1913,	no.	280,	p.	1;	BCIC,	25	March	1914,	no.	289,	
p.	2;	MAIC,	1913,	pp.	187–188).	
During	 the	 inter‐war	 period,	 the	 use	 of	 modern	 marketing	 continued	 to	 be	 as	
important	 as	 it	 had	 been	 in	 pre‐war	 years,	 and	 probably	 even	 more.	 This	 was	
because	new	and	more	expensive	methods	of	advertising	developed.	In	1932–33,	
two	reports	published	in	the	journal	of	the	Spanish	olive	oil	exporters	pointed	out	
that	some	Spanish	export	firms	used	an	“active	and	suggestive”	way	of	advertising	
their	 brands	 consisting	 of	 a	 “raﬄe	 of	 money	 prizes	 among	 their	 consumers”.	
                                                            
10 See,	for	example,	Wilkins	(1992),	Tedlow	(1990),	the	chapters	in	the	volumes	edited	by	Tedlow	
and	Jones	(1990),	Jones	and	Morgan	(1994)	and	Church	and	Godley	(2003b),	respectively,	Church	
(2000)	or	Lopes	(2007).	See	also	the	works	on	the	evolution	of	branding	over	the	nineteenth	and	
twentieth	centuries	by	Duguid,	Lopes	and	Mercer	(2007)	and	Sáiz	and	Fernández	(2009),	which	are	
based	on	registration	data	for	France,	the	USA,	the	United	Kingdom	and	Catalonia	(Spain).	
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Advertising	in	radio	was	also	mentioned.	Moreover,	the	same	studies	suggested	a	
close	relationship	between	advertising	and	firm	market	shares	by	arguing	that	the	
largest	 firms	 invested	a	significant	amount	of	 their	resources	 in	advertising	 their	
products.	These	reports	indicated	that,	in	the	early	1930s,	large	firms	invested,	on	
average,	 one	 Argentinean	 peso	 per	 box	 of	 olive	 oil.	 This	means	 that	 advertising	
costs	 would	 have	 accounted	 for	 1.5–7.2%	 of	 the	 final	 value	 of	 the	 product,	
depending	on	the	information	used	in	the	calculations	(El	Aceite	de	Oliva	de	España	
[AOE],	November	1932,	no.	48,	pp.	299,	301,	and	March	1933,	no.	52,	p.	69).11	
[Figure	3	about	here]	
The	 fact	 that	 packaging,	 branding	 and	 advertising	 were	 extensively	 used	 in	 the	
Americas	 had	 some	 interesting	 consequences.	 The	 most	 obvious	 was	 that	 by	
making	 use	 of	 these	 marketing	 strategies,	 product	 diﬀerentiation	 arose,	 which	
contributed	 to	 increasing	 entry	 barriers	 for	 new	 entrants.	 Figure	 3	 provides	
evidence	suggesting	that	this	was	indeed	the	case,	at	least	in	the	early	1930s.	The	
figure	 correlates	 Spanish	 exporters’	 concentration	 (C4)	 in	 large	markets	 on	 both	
sides	of	 the	Atlantic	versus	 the	percentage	of	 Spanish	olive	oil	 exported	 in	 small	
packages	relative	to	total	Spanish	olive	oil	exports	to	the	selected	market.	Although	
imperfect,	this	latter	measure	is	taken	as	a	proxy	of	the	use	of	modern	marketing	
techniques,	and	therefore	product	diﬀerentiation.12	It	 is	also	worth	noting	that	in	
order	 to	 avoid	 the	 influence	 of	 market	 size	 on	 concentration;	 the	 exercise	 only	
takes	 into	account	the	largest	 foreign	markets	 for	Spanish	olive	oil.	Bearing	all	of	
this	 in	 mind,	 it	 is	 quite	 clear	 that	 levels	 of	 concentration	 tended	 to	 increase	 as	
modern	marketing	techniques	were	used	more	intensively.	As	packaging,	branding	
and	 advertising	 were	 extensively	 applied	 by	 most	 of	 the	 exporters	 involved	 in	
trading	 olive	 oil	 to	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 Atlantic,	 the	 conclusion	 seems	 obvious:	
product	 diﬀerentiation	 advantages	 of	 established	 firms	 acted	 as	 a	 significant	
barrier	to	entry	in	the	American	markets	for	packaged	olive	oil.13	
Although	 evidence	 at	 firm	 level	 is	 not	 available,	 the	 reasons	 explaining	 why	
product	diﬀerentiation	created	entry	barriers	can	be	immediately	deduced	in	the	
light	 of	 the	 literature	 reviewed	 above.	 First,	 the	 use	 of	 modern	 marketing	
strategies	 probably	 increased	 the	 capital	 requirements	 for	 entering	 brand‐name	
olive	 oil	 markets.	 Second,	 these	 same	 strategies	 perhaps	 raised	 sunk	 costs	 for	
potential	 entrants.	 Last,	 the	 growing	 use	 of	 advertising	 and	 other	 modern	
marketing	 techniques	probably	 created	 consumers’	 loyalty	 to	established	brands	
and	 firms.	This	would	have	 led	 to	 the	 existence	of	 certain	market	power	 at	 firm	
level.	
Consumers’	loyalty	had	to	be	cultivated,	however.	As	has	been	noted,	in	the	1930s	
                                                            
11 For	the	sake	of	comparison,	it	can	be	mentioned	that	by	1935,	the	percentage	of	total	advertising	
expenditures	 over	 total	 net	 sales	 on	 food	 products	 and	 health	 drinks	was	 2.9%	 in	 the	 UK.	 This	
figure	was	4.7%	in	the	case	of	total	consumer	goods	(Corley,	1994,	p.	223).	
12  The	 percentage	 of	 olive	 oil	 traded	 to	 foreign	 markets	 in	 small	 packages	 appears	 to	 be	 quite	
adequate	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 packaging	 and	 branding.	 However,	 it	 is	 very	 imperfect	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	
advertising.	 In	 this	 case,	 it	would	be	 appropriate	 to	use	 the	advertising	 expenditures–sales	 ratio,	
which	 is	 also	 used	 as	 a	 measure	 of	 product	 diﬀerentiation	 barriers.	 Unfortunately,	 there	 is	 no	
detailed	information	regarding	the	expenses	in	advertising	of	the	Spanish	exporters	for	the	period	
1930–34.	
13	For		example,		by		1925–29		around		73%		of		the		total		olive		oil		imported		in		the	Americas	was	
packaged	in	cans	and	bottles,	whereas	in	Europe	this	percentage	was	a	mere	7%.	
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Spanish	reports	on	the	Argentinean	olive	oil	market	suggested	a	close	link	between	
advertising	 expenditures	 and	 market	 shares	 owing	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 largest	
export	firms	invested	a	considerable	amount	of	their	resources	in	advertising.	To	
this	must	be	added	that	most	of	 the	firms	mentioned	in	these	reports	were	early	
movers	 in	 that	 they	 had	 entered	 the	 American	 markets	 before	 World	 War	 I.	
Although	fragmentary,	this	evidence	suggests	how	important	it	could	be	for	early	
movers	 to	 continue	 to	 invest	 in	 marketing	 in	 order	 to	 keep	 market	 shares,	 a	
question	 that,	 as	 shown	 above,	 has	 already	 been	 pointed	 out	 by	 the	 historical	
literature	on	branding	and	marketing.	
	
Scale	economies	and	capital	requirements	
	
Commercial	 information	at	 firm	 level	 suggests	 that	 economies	of	 scale	may	have	
been	at	least	as	important	as	product	diﬀerentiation.	In	1925,	the	manager	of	the	
Catalan	firm	Hijos	de	José	Sabater	asked	his	agent	in	Sao	Paulo	(Brazil)	about	the	
(low)	 level	of	orders	 for	 the	 firm’s	brands.	 In	 justifying	why	 the	agent	 should	be	
more	active,	Sabater	stated	that	only	by	increasing	sales	would	his	firm	be	able	“to	
use	 the	 equipment	 more	 eﬃciently,	 which	 [would]	 allow	 [him	 to	 oﬀer]	 better	
selling	conditions”	to	his	clients.	Similar	reasoning	was	made	in	a	letter	written	by	
the	manager	of	the	company	to	his	agent	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	(Brazil).14	If	these	views	
are	correct,	then	the	size	of	the	firm	acted	as	an	entry	barrier	in	the	Americas,	since	
a	 minimum	 eﬃcient	 size	 would	 be	 required	 for	 penetrating	 packaged	 olive	 oil	
markets	in	order	to	take	advantage	of	economies	of	scale.	
Closely	 connected	 to	 the	 question	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 minimum	 eﬃcient	 size,	
there	is	the	 issue	of	capital	requirements	for	entry	 into	 international	markets	for	
olive	oil.	The	available	evidence	suggests	 that	 these	requirements	were	higher	 in	
the	packaged	olive	oil	market	than	in	the	bulk	one	(Manjarrés,	1872,	p.	156;	BCIC,	
15	December	1910,	pp.	2–3;	Ramon	Muñoz,	2000a,	pp.	160–162,	and	2010).	Part	of	
this	was	due	to	the	fact	that	the	production	of	packaged	olive	oil	was	more	capital‐
intensive	 than	 the	 manufacturing	 of	 bulk	 olive	 oil.	 Trading	 packaged	 olive	 oil	
abroad	 also	 increased	 capital	 requirements,	 inter	 alia,	 because	 of	 advertising	
expenditures.	
[Table	4	about	here]	
Were	those	firms	more	orientated	to	trading	packaged	olive	oil	 larger	than	those	
focused	on	exporting	bulk	olive	oil?	If	so,	were	the	former	better	capitalised	than	
the	 latter?	 Table	 4	 provides	 some	 evidence	 on	 these	 issues.	 It	 displays	 data	
elaborated	 from	 a	 sample	 of	 61	 Spanish	 export	 firms	 in	 the	 early	 1930s.	 These	
firms	 accounted	 for	 around	 90%	 of	 the	 total	 olive	 oil	 exported	 by	 Spain	 in	 the	
period	 1930–34.	 Two	 diﬀerent	 groups	 of	 export	 firms	 are	 shown	 in	 the	 table.	
Group	I	includes	exporters	for	which	Latin	America	was	their	main	export	region.	
Note	that	Latin	American	markets	mostly	demanded	brand‐name	olive	oil	for	final	
consumption.	This	could	 indicate	that	a	significant	share	of	the	olive	oil	exported	
by	the	 firms	belonging	to	this	group	was	packaged	olive	oil.	 In	contrast,	Group	II	
integrates	 firms	 that	mainly	 orientated	 their	 exports	 towards	 the	Old	 Continent.	
                                                            
14	 Arxiu	 Comarcal	 del	 Baix	 Camp	 (Reus).	 Fons	 Sabater.	 Copiador	 de	 Cartas.	 Salidas.	 América,	 4	
February	1925,	p.	299;	16	February	1925,	p.	341;	5	May	1926,	pp.	464–465.	
 14	
This	group	also	includes	those	firms	that	mostly	exported	bulk	olive	oil	to	the	USA.	
Table	4	shows	several	indicators	for	the	measurement	of	firm	size.	One	of	them	is	
nominal	capital	per	firm	and	is	used	as	a	proxy	for	firm	capital	requirements.	It	is	
worth	 noting	 that	 there	 is	 a	 clear	 association	 between	 the	 indicators	 used	 for	
measuring	firm	size	and	firm	nominal	capital,	since	it	 is	obvious	that	a	 large	firm	
requires	 larger	 amounts	 of	 physical	 capital	 and	 vice	 versa	 (Bain,	 1956,	 pp.	 156–
157).	Needless	to	say,	all	the	indicators	presented	in	the	table	are	clearly	imperfect.	
This	is	partly	due	to	the	lack	of	appropriate	data	and	the	problems	associated	with	
the	measurement	of	economies	of	scale,	as	will	be	explained	below.	
The	key	point	that	needs	to	be	considered	from	the	information	displayed	in	Table	
4	 is	 whether	 those	 firms	more	 orientated	 to	 trading	 in	 packaged	 olive	 oil	 were	
larger	and	required	more	capital	than	those	more	focused	on	exporting	bulk	olive	
oil.	 Unfortunately,	 the	 results	 presented	 in	 the	 table	 do	 not	 give	 a	 definitive	
answer.	They	show	that	the	average	exports	per	firm,	the	average	capital	per	firm	
or	any	of	 the	other	proxies	used	 for	measuring	 firm	size	or	capital	 requirements	
were	 substantially	 higher	 in	 Group	 I	 than	 in	 Group	 II.	 As	 the	 qualitative	
information	suggested,	 this	would	 indicate	 that	both	 the	minimum	eﬃcient	 scale	
and	the	capital	requirements	of	those	firms	dealing	with	brand‐name	olive	oil	had	
to	be	higher	than	the	rest.	
Nevertheless,	a	closer	 look	at	 the	 information	presented	 in	Table	4	suggests	 that	
size	and	capital	requirements	varied	substantially	within	each	group	of	firms.	For	
example,	 in	 Group	 I,	 only	 44%	 of	 the	 firms	 (i.e.	 10	 out	 of	 23)	 had	 a	 size,	 as	
measured	by	 total	exports,	equal	 to	or	above	 the	Spanish	average.	This	seems	 to	
suggest	 that	 the	 scale	 economies	 or	 capital	 requirements	 as	 entry	 deterrents	 in	
markets	 for	 packaged	 and	 brand‐name	 olive	 oil	 has	 a	 more	 ambiguous	 than	
initially	expected.	
[Figure	4	about	here]	
This	 ambiguous	 role	 also	 emerges	 when	 firm	 size	 is	 compared	 to	 levels	 of	
concentration	 across	 individual	markets.	 Using	 Spanish	 export	 data	 at	 firm	 level	
for	the	period	1930–34,	Figure	4	correlates	firm	size	versus	firm	concentration	in	
43	individual	foreign	markets.	Firm	size	is	proxied	by	the	total	average	exports	of	
those	firms	trading	with	the	selected	individual	market,	while	 firm	concentration	
refers	 to	 the	 four‐firm	 concentration	 ratio	 (C4)	 of	 the	 Spanish	 exporters	 in	 the	
considered	 market.	 The	 figure	 speaks	 for	 itself.	 Size	 correlates	 positively	 with	
concentration.	Its	influence	is	far	from	negligible.	In	spite	of	this,	the	coeﬃcient	of	
determination	 suggests	 that	 firm	 size	 explained	 much	 less	 of	 the	 concentration	
levels,	 and	 therefore	 of	 entry	 barriers	 in	 the	 international	markets	 for	 olive	 oil,	
than	product	diﬀerentiation	did	 (Figure	4,	R2	=	0.31,	Figure	3,	R2	=	0.63).	This	 is	
true	both	when	all	the	markets	in	the	sample	are	included	in	the	correlation,	as	in	
Figure	 4,	 but	 also	when	 the	 14	 largest	markets	 of	 the	 sample	 are	 the	 only	 ones	
taken	 into	 account	 in	order	 to	 control	 for	 the	 eﬀect	 of	market	 size.	 In	 this	 latter	
case,	the	coeﬃcient	of	determination	(R2)	is	also	quite	low	(0.38).	
Certainly,	the	results	of	these	simple	bivariate	correlations	need	to	be	treated	with	
caution.	 In	 the	exercise,	 the	variable	used	 for	measuring	 firm	size	has	been	 total	
average	exports	per	firm	operating	in	the	considered	market.	This	indicator	biases	
the	 results	 of	 the	 correlations	 in	 at	 least	 two	 diﬀerent	 ways:	 first,	 it	 is	 very	
sensitive	to	the	number	(and	size)	of	the	firms	operating	in	the	selected	markets;	
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second,	 it	 is	 very	 insensitive	 to	 the	 share	 that	 these	 firms	 have	 achieved	 in	 the	
individual	market.	Because	of	this,	total	average	exports	per	firm	operating	in	the	
considered	 market	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 a	 very	 good	 indicator	 of	 the	 minimum	
eﬃcient	scale	of	the	firms	in	each	of	the	43	markets	included	in	the	sample.	In	the	
light	of	these	caveats,	other	proxies	for	scale	economies	might	be	constructed	such	
as	 those	 suggested	 by	 Florence	 (1933)	 or	 Comanor	 and	 Wilson	 (1967).	
Nevertheless,	these	proxies	are	not	free	from	problems	either.15	
To	 summarise,	 the	 available	 evidence	 presented	 above	 is	 still	 fragmentary.	 The	
measurement	 of	 economies	 of	 scale	 and	 minimum	 eﬃcient	 scale	 also	 presents	
several	shortcomings.	Consequently,	it	is	diﬃcult	to	oﬀer	conclusive	answers.	The	
impression	is	that	both	economies	of	scale	and	some	minimal	capital	requirements	
had	 to	 be	 achieved	 in	 order	 to	 produce	 and	 commercialise	 brand‐name	olive	oil	
even	 though	 the	 threshold	 level	 of	 both	 has	 been	 impossible	 to	 be	 established.	
Firm	 size	 and	 capital	 requirement	 probably	 have	 had	 some	 influence	 on	
concentration	 and,	 consequently,	 on	 entry	 barriers.	 However,	 judging	 from	 the	
available	 evidence,	 this	 influence	 seems	 less	 in	 comparison	 to	 product	
diﬀerentiation.	 In	 fact,	 a	 significant	 number	 of	 small	 firms	 populated	 the	 Latin	
American	markets,	 although	 it	 is	 true	 that	 they	 generally	 accounted	 for	 a	 small	
share	of	the	market.	
	
Economies	of	agglomeration	and	absolute	cost	advantages	of	incumbent	firms	
	
For	the	firms	that	apparently	lacked	a	minimum	eﬃcient	scale	in	the	early	1930s,	
other	factors	might	have	eased	their	entry	(and	survival)	in	the	American	markets	
for	packaged	olive	oil.	Economies	of	agglomeration	might	be	one	of	these	factors.	
Indeed,	two‐thirds	of	Spanish	firms	in	the	early	1930s	whose	main	export	region	
was	 Latin	 America	 were	 located	 in	 (and	 exported	 from)	 the	 coastal	 cities	 of	
Barcelona	 (Catalonia)	 and,	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 Seville	 (Andalusia)	 (Table	 5).	 This	
geographic	 concentration	 probably	 arose	 due	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 agglomeration	
economies	linked	to	commercial	services	and	trade	flows.	In	these	two	cities,	olive	
oil	 export	 firms	 could	 have	 taken	 advantage	 of	 both	 the	 existing	 supply	 of	
commercial	services	and	the	intensity	of	trade	flows	with	Latin	America.	Whether	
economies	of	agglomeration	increased	(or	reduced)	barriers	to	entry	into	markets	
for	brand‐name	olive	oil	is	harder	to	establish.	
[Table	5	about	here]	
Besides	 agglomeration	 economies,	 another	 factor	may	 explain	 why,	 in	 the	 early	
1930s,	 firms	 that	 were	 small	 by	 Spanish	 standards	 were	 mostly	 orientated	
towards	the	American	markets	for	packaged	and	brand‐name	olive	oil.	This	factor	
has	 to	 do	with	 the	 existence	 of	 absolute	 cost	 advantages	 of	 early	movers,	which	
was	 the	 third	 barrier	 to	 entry	 suggested	 in	 Bain’s	 classic	 book.	 To	 start	 with,	
commercial	 experience	 seems	 to	 have	 played	 a	 role	 in	 penetrating	 American	
markets	 for	brand‐name	olive	oil.	 Both	 exporters	 and	experts	 repeatedly	 argued	
that	 knowledge	 about	 consumers’	 tastes	 and	 the	 marketing	 of	 the	 product	 was	
essential	 in	brand‐name	olive	oil	exports	(e.g.	Manjarrés,	1872,	p.	155;	AOE,	May	
                                                            
15	For	a	review	of	these	and	other	measures	of	economies	of	scale,	see,	for	example,	Lyons	(1980),	
Davies	(1980),	and	Curry	and	George	(1983).	
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1929,	no.	5,	p.	31).	In	general,	this	knowledge	was	only	acquired	after	several	years	
of	commercial	experience.	
If	experience	was	important	to	enter	these	markets,	it	could	also	be	hypothesised	
that	 the	 costs	 of	 producing	 and	 exporting	 packaged	 olive	 oil	 substantially	
decreased	as	the	experience	of	firms	increased.	First,	exporters	that	entered	these	
markets	 earlier	 could	 have	 acquired	 a	 deep	 knowledge	 about	 both	 consumers’	
tastes	 and	 the	marketing	 of	 the	 product.	 Second,	 these	 early	movers	 could	 have	
established	 solid	 commercial	 networks.	 Last,	 they	 could	 have	 become	 more	
eﬃcient	 in	 producing	 and	 exporting	 brand‐name	 olive	 oil.	 Consequently,	
incumbent	 firms	 might	 have	 enjoyed	 absolute	 cost	 advantages	 over	 potential	
entrants,	which	would	have	contributed	to	deter	entry	in	the	Americas.	
Certainly,	 by	 1930–34	 a	 large	 share	 of	 the	 Spanish	 exporters	 dealing	 with	
packaged	 olive	 oil	 consisted	 of	 experienced	 firms.	 An	 inspection	 of	 the	 figures	
presented	 in	 Table	 5	 shows	 that	 by	 the	 early	 1930s,	 Spanish	 early‐movers	
intensively	populated	 the	 group	of	 Spanish	 firms	whose	main	 export	 region	was	
Latin	America	(Group	1).	Of	the	Spanish	firms	that	belonged	to	this	group,	almost	
80%	had	been	set	up	prior	to	World	War	I;	more	than	60%	had	already	begun	to	
export	to	the	Americas	before	1914,	whereas	most	of	the	other	firms	belonging	to	
this	group	started	to	penetrate	these	markets	during	World	War	I.	
This	evidence	could	suggest	that	firms	that	entered	the	American	markets	earlier	
enjoyed	 absolute	 cost	 advantages	 over	 new	 entrants.	 However,	 it	 could	 also	 be	
concluded	 that	 the	 competitive	 advantage	 of	 many	 firms	 dealing	 with	 packaged	
olive	 oil	 was	 linked	 to	 the	 ability	 to	 create	 niche	 markets	 through	 product	
diﬀerentiation	 rather	 than	 to	 the	 capacity	 for	 decreasing	 costs.	 Therefore,	 at	 the	
present	stage	of	research,	 it	 is	very	diﬃcult	to	know	whether	and	to	what	extent	
absolute	cost	advantages	of	incumbent	firms	deterred	entry	into	the	Americas.	
	
An	econometric	 test	 for	explaining	 the	 influence	of	product	diﬀerentiation	as	
an	entry	barrier	
	
Throughout	this	paper,	it	has	been	suggested	that	product	diﬀerentiation	may	have	
played	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 making	 entry	 barriers	 higher	 on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	
Atlantic	than	elsewhere.	By	contrast,	the	influence	of	scale	economies	and	absolute	
cost	advantages	of	established	firms	appears	to	have	been	more	moderate.	To	this	
must	 be	 added	 that	 the	 evolution	 of	 markets	 contributed	 to	 the	 rise	 of	 entry	
barriers	in	the	New	World.	After	the	end	of	World	War	I,	as	the	American	markets	
for	olive	oil	matured,	entry	barriers	associated	with	product	diﬀerentiation	appear	
to	have	been	more	apparent	for	potential	entrants.	
There	 is	no	doubt	that	only	by	means	of	econometric	analysis	can	the	role	of	 the	
potential	entry	barriers	be	properly	assessed.	This	kind	of	analysis	would	require	
reliable	proxies	for	product	diﬀerentiation,	scale	economies	and	costs	at	firm	level.	
Indicators	 on	 the	 evolution	 of	 markets	 would	 also	 have	 to	 be	 taken	 into	
consideration.	As	stated	before,	it	is	unfortunate	that	the	appropriate	quantitative	
evidence	is	lacking	for	most	of	these	variables,	or	at	least	for	most	of	the	variables	
more	 clearly	 identified	 as	 entry	 barriers	 by	 the	 literature	 on	 industrial	
organisation.	 The	 only	 exception	 refers	 to	 product	 diﬀerentiation	 since	 Spanish	
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export	 data	 on	 the	 size	 of	 the	 packages	 of	 the	 exported	 olive	 oil	 seem	 to	 be	 an	
appropriate	proxy	 for	measuring	 the	 intensity	 in	 the	use	of	packaging,	 branding,	
and	to	a	lesser	extent,	advertising	in	foreign	markets.	
With	 this	 evidence	 on	 the	 size	 of	 the	 packages,	 an	 econometric	 model	 is	
constructed	 in	 order	 to	 measure	 whether,	 and	 to	 what	 extent,	 product	
diﬀerentiation	 influenced	 concentration,	 and	 therefore,	 entry	 barriers.	 The	
econometric	 model	 employed	 here	 is	 estimated	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 cross‐sectional	
data;	 it	 uses	 least	 squares	 and	 is	 very	 simple	 but	 useful	 for	 our	 purposes.	 The	
dependent	 variable	 is	 the	 level	 of	 Spanish	 exporting	 firms’	 concentration	 in	 a	
sample	of	43	 foreign	markets	 for	 the	period	1930–34.	The	data	used	to	calculate	
concentration	 have	 been	 obtained	 from	 a	 sample	 of	 58	 Spanish	 exporting	 firms.	
Concentration	 is	measured	by	 the	 four‐firm	concentration	ratio	 (C4)	and	appears	
to	be	more	appropriate	for	our	purposes	than	the	Hirschman–Herfindahl	index.16	
There	are	two	 independent	variables.	The	 first	 is	 the	percentage	of	Spanish	olive	
oil	exported	in	small	packages	relative	to	total	Spanish	olive	oil	exports	to	each	of	
the	 selected	markets.	 This	 captures	 the	 existence	 of	 product	 diﬀerentiation.	 The	
second	 independent	 variable	 is	market	 size	 as	measured	 by	 the	 total	 amount	 of	
olive	oil	exported	by	the	 firms	of	 the	sample	to	each	 individual	market.	The	data	
that	 make	 up	 the	 model	 are	 expressed	 in	 logarithms	 and	 have	 been	 previously	
transformed	into	index	numbers	(USA	=	100).	
[Table	6	about	here]	
Table	 6	 summarises	 the	 results	 of	 the	 estimation	 of	 the	 model.	 Weighted	 least	
squares	 are	 used	 in	 order	 to	 correct	 for	 the	 presence	 of	 cross‐section	
heteroscedasticity.	 According	 to	 the	 applied	 tests	 (Jarque‐Bera	 and	 White),	 the	
behaviour	of	the	residuals	 is	adequate.	The	adjusted	R‐squared	is	also	acceptable	
and	 relatively	 high.17	 As	 far	 as	 the	 independent	 variables	 of	 the	 model	 are	
concerned,	 they	 also	 appear	 to	 behave	 as	 expected.	 The	 proxy	 used	 for	 export	
marketing	 techniques	 obtains	 the	 expected	 (positive)	 sign	 and	 is	 statistically	
significant	at	the	1%	level.	The	magnitude	of	the	coeﬃcient	is	relatively	low,	or	at	
least	 lower,	 than	 a	 priori	 one	would	 expect.	However,	 this	 coeﬃcient	 is	 not	 that	
diﬀerent	 from	 that	 obtained	 for	 the	 size	 of	 the	 foreign	market.	 This	 is	 the	 other	
explanatory	variable	included	in	the	model.	As	can	be	seen,	the	size	of	the	foreign	
market	also	obtains	 the	expected	(negative)	sign	and	 is	 statistically	significant	at	
                                                            
16	As	the	HHI	overestimates	the	weight	of	the	largest	firms,	it	appears	to	be	more	appropriate	to	use	
this	index	when	the	purpose	of	the	research	is	to	measure	the	level	of	oligopoly	in	the	market	(see	
Hannah	&	Kay,	1977). 
17	The	White	test	allows	determining	whether	heteroscedasticity	is	present	in	the	regression	model.	
Heteroscedasticity	refers	to	the	presence	of	nonconstant	error	variance	across	observations,	which	
violates	an	 important	assumption	of	the	classical	 linear	regression	model.	The	Jarque‐Bera	test	 is	
used	to	establish	whether	or	not	the	data	in	the	regression	model	are	from	a	normal	distribution.	In	
any	case,	 the	presence	of	both	heteroscedasticity	and	no	normal	distribution	bias	 the	results	and	
may	lead	to	misleading	conclusions.	In	our	case,	White’s	test	indicates	that	the	null	hypothesis	of	no	
heteroscedasticity	can	be	accepted	at	 the	1%	of	significance	 level.	On	the	other	hand,	 the	 Jarque‐
Bera	test	indicates	that	the	null	hypothesis	of	normal	distribution	of	the	series	can	be	accepted	at	
the	 10%	 level.	 The	 model	 has	 been	 replicated	 by	 using	 as	 a	 measure	 of	 concentration	 the	 HHI	
instead	 of	 the	 C4	 ratio.	 Unfortunately,	 the	 applied	 tests	 (White	 and	 Jarque‐Bera)	 indicate	 the	
presence	 of	 cross‐section	 heteroscedasticity	 and	 not	 normally	 residual	 distributed	 series,	 even	
though	the	coeﬃcients	of	the	equation	for	the	independent	variables	have	the	expected	sign	and	are	
statistically	significant.	
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the	1%	level.18	
On	the	basis	of	these	results,	several	conclusions	may	be	raised.	The	first	and	most	
obvious	is	that	a	number	of	factors	have	influenced	exporters’	concentration	in	the	
international	 markets	 for	 olive	 oil.	 The	 size	 of	 the	 market	 was	 one	 of	 them.	
However,	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 section,	 it	 is	 worth	 pointing	 out	 that	 export	
marketing	did	not	play	a	neutral	role	in	concentration.	On	the	contrary,	the	results	
of	 the	 model	 confirm	 that	 ceteris	 paribus	 foreign	 markets	 in	 which	 packaging,	
branding	and	advertising	were	used	more	intensively	had	a	higher	concentration	
of	 exporters,	 and	 therefore	 higher	 entry	 barriers.	 As	 previously	 stated,	 the	
Americas	were	the	area	of	largest	use	of	modern	marketing	techniques	in	olive	oil.	
In	consequence,	it	seems	obvious	to	conclude	that	it	was	in	the	American	markets	
where	potential	 new	entrants	 probably	 had	 to	 incur	 additional	 costs	 in	 order	 to	
achieve	market	penetration	due	to	product	diﬀerentiation.	
This	does	not	mean	 that	 entry	barriers	 in	American	markets	were	 impossible	 to	
surmount.	 This	 does	 not	 mean	 either	 that	 product	 diﬀerentiation	 was	 the	 only	
source	of	entry	barrier	on	the	other	side	of	the	Atlantic.	It	simply	means	that	both	
the	 characteristics	 and	 the	 competitive	 conditions	 of	 the	American	markets	may	
have	influenced	the	final	decision	of	olive	oil	exporting	firms.	This	in	turn	may	help	
to	explain	the	likely	deceleration	of	the	entry	process	amongst	the	Mediterranean	
exporters	 of	 packaged	 olive	 oil	 that	 took	 place	 in	 the	 Americas	 after	 the	 end	 of	
World	War	I.	
	
Conclusions	
	
This	article	has	explored	the	entry	process	and	its	determinants	in	the	case	of	the	
Mediterranean	exporters	of	packaged	olive	oil	 to	 the	Americas	during	 the	1880s	
and	the	1930s.	 It	has	 focused	on	arguing	that	as	markets	matured	entry	barriers	
became	more	apparent	for	potential	entrants,	and	that	this	might	have	played	an	
important	role	in	explaining	the	dynamics	of	firms’	entry	in	the	Americas	prior	to	
World	War	II.	By	1930–34,	entry	barriers	were	on	average	higher	in	the	New	than	
in	 the	Old	World.	 These	 diﬀerences	 in	 the	 height	 of	 entry	 barriers	 arose	 in	 part	
from	 product	 diﬀerentiation	 through	 packaging,	 branding	 and	 advertising.	 This	
finally	contributed	to	the	emergence	of	early‐entrant	advantages	and	the	increase	
of	 entry	 barriers	 in	 the	 Americas.	 By	 around	 1930,	 firms	 that	 had	 entered	 the	
markets	on	the	other	side	of	the	Atlantic	before	World	War	I	still	accounted	for	a	
significant	share	of	the	exports	of	packaged	olive	oil	sent	to	Argentina	and	the	USA.	
Relative	 to	 product	 diﬀerentiation,	 the	 role	 played	 by	 economies	 of	 scale	 and	
absolute	 cost	 advantages	 as	 entry	 barriers	 seems	 of	 less	 importance,	 although	 a	
definitive	 answer	 cannot	be	 given	due	 to	 the	 lack	of	 appropriate	data	 as	well	 as	
measurement	problems.	
These	 results	 have	 several	 implications.	 In	 the	 light	 of	 the	 existing	 literature	 on	
industrial	organisation,	they	confirm	that	entry	is	attracted	by	market	growth,	but	
product	diﬀerentiation	may	increase	entry	barriers	over	the	long	run.	According	to	
the	 results	 of	 the	 econometric	 model	 presented	 in	 this	 paper,	 product	
                                                            
18	Exporters’	concentration	ratio	remarkably	varied	across	markets,	but	these	variations	were	not	
enormous.	This	might	help	to	explain	the	low	levels	of	these	coeﬃcients.	
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diﬀerentiation	(as	measured	by	the	type	of	package	the	product	was	traded)	 is	a	
variable	 statistically	 significant	 in	 explaining	 levels	 of	 firms’	 concentration,	 and	
therefore	entry	barriers.	
The	findings	of	this	article	can	also	be	discussed	in	the	context	of	business	history	
and,	 particularly,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 marketing	 and	 branding	 history.	 They	 have	
shown	that	in	line	with	other	markets	for	food	and	drinks,	modern	marketing	also	
emerged	in	the	international	olive	oil	markets	at	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century.	
It	 has	 also	made	 clear	 that,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 other	 consumer	 goods,	 packaging,	
branding	and	advertising	became	essential	factors	in	penetrating	foreign	markets,	
but	also	that	the	use	of	modern	marketing	techniques	could	benefit	early	movers	
and	 could	 deter	 entry.	 As	 pointed	 out	 by	 other	 scholars,	 some	 of	 the	 evidence	
presented	 in	 this	 article	 has	 also	 shown	 that	 early	 movers	 needed	 to	 continue	
investing	 in	 advertising	 to	 preserve	 their	 initial	 advantages	 as	 early	 entrants.	
Finally,	the	preceding	paragraphs	have	suggested	that	market	evolution	had	a	role	
to	play	in	firms’	entry	processes.	
In	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 international	 markets	 for	 olive	 oil,	 the	 results	 of	 this	
article	 lead	 to	 another	 interesting	 conclusion.	 In	 the	 American	 markets	 for	
packaged	 and	 brand‐name	 olive	 oil,	 early	 movers	 could	 probably	 retain	 higher	
market	 shares	 than	 late	 entrants	which	 coped	with	 higher	 entry	 barriers	 as	 the	
markets	 became	 more	 mature.	 Italian	 export	 firms	 penetrated	 earlier	 than	 the	
Spanish	ones	in	the	largest	American	markets	for	olive	oil.	This	probably	had	long‐
term	consequences,	for	example	by	giving	Italian	firms	a	certain	market	power	as	
first	entrants.	By	the	late	1920s,	the	Italian	firms	still	accounted	for	around	60%	of	
the	total	American	olive	oil	imports;	the	Spanish	share	was	around	30%.	
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Tables	
	
	
Table	1.	The	better‐known	brands	(and	 firms)	 for	olive	oil	 in	Buenos	Aires	
(Argentina)	 according	 to	 both	 Spanish	 and	 Italian	 consular	 information,	 c.	
1887–c.	1913.	
	c.	1887	 c.	1900	 c.	1913	
Panel	1.	French	brands	(and	firms)	 	
.	Cheval	(n.d.)	 .	Plagniol	(James	Plagniol) .	Cordon	Bleau	(S.	Saugues	&	Co.)	
.	Plagniol	(James	Plagniol)	 .	Puget	(Adolphe	Puget) .	Plagniol	(James	Plagniol)	
.	Puget	(Adolphe	Puget)	 	 .	Puget	(Adolphe	Puget)	
	 	 .	Nini	(n.d.)	
	 	 .	Saugues	(S.	Saugues	&	Co.)	
Panel	2.	Italian	brands	(and	firms)*	
.	Ardissone	(Fratelli	 .	Extra	Lucca	n.1	(n.d.) .	Boccanegra	(Tommaso	Moro	
Ardissone	fu	O.B.	[?])	 .	Extra	Lucca	D.O.	(n.d.) &	Figli)
.	Biancheri	(n.d.)	 .	Leveratto	&	Raggio	[?] .	Costa	[?]	(Francesco	Costa	
.	Muratorio	n.1	 (Leveratto &	Figli)
(Carlo	Muratorio	[?])	 &	Hermanos	Raggio) .	Extra	Lucca	(Luigi	Parpaglioni)	
.	Ottone	(Giuseppe	 .	Lucca	Costa .	Helvetia	(n.d.)
Ottone	&	Figli)	 (n.d.) .	Lavagnino	(n.d.)
.	Salvo	(n.d.)	 .	Lucca	Perla	(n.d.) .	Leone	(Carlo	Muratorio	fu	GB)	
	 .	T.	Moro	(Tommaso	 .	Leveratto	(L.	Leveratto)	
	 Moro	&	Figli) .	T.	Moro	(Tommaso	Moro	
	 .	Tixi	Extra	Olivo	 &	Figli)
	 (A.	Canepa	&	Co.) .	P.	Moro	(Pio	Moro)	
	 	 .	C.	Muratorio
	 	 (Carlo	Muratorio	fu	GB)	
	 	 .	T.	Muratorio	(Tommaso	
	 	 Muratorio)
	 	 .	Ottone	(Giuseppe	Ottone	&	Figli)	
	 	 .	Raggio	(L	Raggio	Hermanos)	
	 	 .	Tixi	(A.	Canepa	&	Co.)	
Panel	3.	Spanish	brands	(and	firms)	
.	Porcar	y	Tió	 .	Porcar	y	Tió .	Bau	(José	Bau)
(Manuel	Porcar	y	Tió) (Manuel	Porcar	y	Tió) .	Conill	Hermanos	A	
.	Quinzà(Quinzà	 .	Conill	Hermanos	A (Conill	Hermanos)	
Hermanos)	 (Conill	Hermanos) .	D.	Gómez	(Diego	Gómez)	
.	Conill	Hermanos	 .	Sensat	(Gerardo .	Lorenzo	(A.	Lorenzo)	
(Conill	 Sensat	e	Hijos) .	Luca	de	Tena	(Hijos	de	
Hermanos)	 .	Martí(n.d.) Luca	de	Tena)
.	Sensat	(Gerardo	 	 .	Minerva	(n.d.)	
Sensat	e	Hijos)	 	 .	Porcar	y	Tió(Manuel	
	 	 Porcar	y	Tió)
	 	 .	La	Reina	(n.d.)
	 	 .	Salat	(José Salat	e	Hijos)	
	 	 .	Saturno	(José Puigdollers	[?])	
	 	 .	Sensat	(Gerardo	Sensat	e	Hijos)	
Notes:	 *Brands	owned	by	Argentinean	 firms	of	 Italian	origin	are	 included;	Co.,	Company;	n.d.,	no	
data	available.		
Source:	Ramon	Muñoz	(2010).	
	 	
 26	
Table	2.		The	Italian	and	Spanish	leading	exporters	of	packaged	olive	oil	to	
Argentina	and	the	USA	c.	1930.	
	 																	Location	 Argentina USA	
														Firms	 				(city,	region,	country) 	 	Origins Share* Rank Share*	 Rank
Tommaso	Moro	&	Figli	 Genoa	(Liguria‐IT)	 Before	1888	 19	 1 	 2	–	4	 7	
Escoﬃer	Guidi**	 Sanremo	(Liguria‐IT) c.	1834 8 2 3	–	6	 5
Giorgio	Ottone	&	Figli	 Genoa	(Liguria‐IT) Before	1887 7 3 n.d.	 n.d.
Fratelli	Berio	 Oneglia	(Liguria‐IT) 1870 7 4 n.d.	 n.d.
Olivarera	del	
					Mediterráneo	 n.d.	 n.d.	 6	 5 	 n.d.	 n.d.
P.	Sasso	&	Figli**	 Oneglia	(Liguria‐IT) c.	1860 6 6 3	–	6	 6
Hijos	de	Ybarra	 Seville	(Andalusia‐SP) 1842 5 6 4	–	10	 4
Pietro	Bresciano	fu	Pietro Imperia	(Liguria‐IT) 1850 4 8 n.d.	 n.d.
ASTOR	 n.d.	 n.d. 3 9 n.d.	 n.d.
Aceites	Bau	 Tortosa	(Catalonia‐SP) 1842 3 10 0	–	1	 n.d.
Joseph	Lupi	
Porto	Maurizio	(Liguri‐
aIT)	 1880	 3	 11 	 n.d.	 n.d.
Miguel	G.	Longoria	&	Co. Seville	(Andalusia‐SP) c.	1904 3 12 0	–	1	 n.d.
Pietro	Salvo	
Porto	Maurizio	
(Liguria‐IT)	 n.d. 2 13 	 2	–	4	 8
Giacomo	Costa	fu	Andrea Genoa	(Liguria‐IT) 1854 2 14 7	–	14	 2
Francesco	Bertolli	 Lucca	(Tuscany‐IT) 1865 1 15 7	–	14	 1
Frugone	&	Preve	 Genoa	(Liguria‐IT) 1856 1 16 n.d.	 n.d.
SALOV	(brands	Filippo	 Lucca	(Tuscany‐IT) 1867/1919 1 17 6	–	12	 3
Berio	and	Calisto	
Francesconi)**	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Hijos	de	Luca	de	Tena	 Seville	(Andalusia‐SP) 1840 1 18 1	–	2	 n.d.
Vincenzo	Salvo	 Bordighera	(Liguria‐IT) 1897 1 19 n.d.	 n.d.
G.	Sensat,	Hijos	
Barcelona	(Catalonia‐
SP)	 1878 1 20 	 1	–	2	 n.d.
Hijos	de	José	Sabater	 Reus	(Catalonia‐SP) 1824 1 21 n.d.	 n.d.
Carbonell	&	Co.	
Córdoba	(Andalusia‐
SP)	 1866	 0	 22 	 1	–	3	 9	
Carlo	Daneri	&	Figlio	
Porto	Maurizio	
(Liguria‐IT)	 1830	 0	 23 	 1	–	2	 n.d.
Notes:	 In	1923,	Porto	Maurizio	and	Oneglia	were	unified	 in	a	single	municipality.	The	city	 took	 the	name	of	
Imperia;	 *	percentage	of	 the	 total	 imports	of	packaged	olive	oil.	 For	 the	 case	of	 the	United	States,	 the	 table	
shows	the	estimated	 lower	and	upper	bounds;	**	Escoﬃer	Guidi	was	 first	established	 in	Nice,	but	moved	to	
Sanremo	after	 the	 Italian	Unification.	P.	 Sasso	&	Figli	was	 the	name	 that	adopted	Agostino	Novaro’s	 firm	 in	
1899	when	he	moved	from	Diano	Marina	to	Oneglia.	SALOV	is	the	acronym	for	Società	Azionaria	Lucchese	Olii	
e	Vini,	which	was	set	up	in	1919	by	several	growers,	producers	and	exporters	from	Lucca.	The	year	1867	was	
when	 Filippo	 Berio	 olive	 oil	 began	 to	 be	 sold	 in	 Italy.	 IT	 =	 Italy;	 SP	 =	 Spain;	 Co.,	 Company;	 n.d.,	 no	 data	
available.	
Sources:	Text	and	Notes.	
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Table	3.		Levels	of	firm	concentration	of	the	Spanish	exports	by	regions,	
1930–34.	
	
No.	of	
countries	
include	
Individual	
countries	
(unweighted	
average)	
Regional	and	
continental	
aggregation	
Olive	oil	exported	by	the	
Spanish	firms	
(metric	tons)	
	
(I)	 C4		
(II)	
HHI	
(III)	
C4
(IV)	
HHI	
(V)	
Total	
(VI)	
Per	
market	(VII)	
North	 2	 72.3 0.168 54.4 0.097 13,171	 6,585
Central/Antilles	 10	 85.8 0.399 60.2 0.114 9,827	 983	
South	 10	 85.0 0.292 66.7 0.134 18,322	 1,832
Total	America	 22	 80.9 0.329 47.9 0.075 41,320	 1,878
Scandinavia	 4	 83.0 0.291 49.6 0.095 2,681	 670	
Others	North	 9	 88.7 0.444 54.5 0.108 3,628	 403	
South	 3	 56.2 0.109 46.1 0.079 15,660	 5,220
Total	Europe	 16	 81.2 0.343 38.7 0.060 21,969	 1,373
Others	 5	 88.2 0.354 56.2 0.095 348	 70	
Total	 43	 83.5 0.337 36.9 0.053 63,637	 1,480
Sources:	Figure	1;	text;	Estadística(s)	del	Comercio	Exterior	de	España,	1930–34.	
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Table	4.	Size	and	capital	 requirements	of	61	Spanish	olive	oil	export	 firms	
grouped	according	to	the	geographical	destination	of	their	exports,	1930–34.	
	 Groups 	 	
	 I	(Latin II (Other All	 Ratio
Proxies	 America) Regions) sample	 (I/II)
1.	Average	exports	per	firm,	1930–34	(’000	kg) 1559 832 	 1106	 1.9
%	of	firms	with	exports	equal	to	 44 26 33	 1.7
or	above	the	Spanish	average	 	 	
%	of	firms	with	exports	equal	to	 39 32 34	 1.2
or	above	the	group	average	 	 	
2.	Average	capacity	of	refining	 300 245 274	 1.2
per	firm,	c.	1935	(’00s	kg	per	24	hours) 	 	
%	of	firms	possessing	their	own	 57 32 39	 1.8
refining	plants	 	 	
%	of	firms	with	a	capacity	equal	to	 54 42 48	 1.3
or	above	the	Spanish	average	 	 	
%	of	firms	with	a	capacity	equal	to	 46 42 44	 1.1
or	above	the	group	average	 	 	
3.	Average	nominal	capital	per	firm	 3252 2143 2655	 1.5
c.	1935	(’000	pesetas)*	 	 	
%	of	firms	with	capital	equal	to	 37 29 33	 1.3
or	above	the	Spanish	average	 	 	
%	of	firms	with	capital	equal	to	 21 29 25	 0.7
or	above	the	group	average	 	 	
Notes:	*It	only	includes	information	for	40	firms.	
Sources:	Ramon	Muñoz	(2000b,	pp.	129–132,	2000c,	pp.	185–200).	
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Table	5.	Location	and	commercial	experience	of	61	Spanish	olive	oil	export	
firms	 grouped	 according	 to	 the	 geographical	 destination	 of	 their	 exports,	
1930–34	(as	a	percentage	of	the	firms	belonging	to	the	group).	
	 													Groups	 	 	
	 I	(Latin II	(Other	 All	 Ratio
Proxies	and	indicators America) regions) sample	 (I/II)
1.	Proxies	for	economies	of	agglomeration	(geographical	location	of	the	firm’s	head	oﬃce)	
Firms	from	North‐eastern	Spain	 52 37 43	 1.4
Firms	from	Central	and	Southern	Spain 48 63 57	 0.8
Firms	from	Barcelona	(North‐east)	 43 11 23	 4.1
Firms	from	Seville	(South)	 22 5 11	 4.1
2.	Proxies	for	commercial	experience	and	entry	into	foreign	markets 	 	
Firms	set	up	prior	to	1900*	 57 28 40	 2.0
Firms	set	up	prior	to	1914*	 78 48 62	 1.6
Firms	exporting	olive	oil	prior	to	1900 39 13 23	 3.0
Firms	exporting	olive	oil	prior	to	1914 61 37 46	 1.7
Firms	that	entered	Latin	America	prior	to	1914 61 8 28	 7.7
Notes:	*Only	includes	information	for	52	firms.	
Source:	Table	4.	
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Table	 6.	 Determinants	 of	 Spanish	 exporting	 firms’	 concentration	 (C4)	 by	
foreign	markets,	1930–34.	
	
Independent	variables	 Coeﬃcients	 t‐statistic
Constant	 4.781***	 (90.959)
Modern	marketing	(percentage	of	olive 0.044***	 (3.637)
oil	exported	in	small	packages)	 	
Size	(olive	oil	exported	by	the	firms	of	the	sample) ‐0.055***	 (‐8.230)
Adjusted	R2	 0.694 	
Jarque‐Bera	test	 5.926* 	
White	test	 4.636***	 	
Included	observations 43 	
Notes:	***1%	significance	level;	**5%	significance	level;	*10%	significance	level.		
Sources:	Text,	Notes	and	Table	3.	
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